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Obscenity -Federal Statutes Prohibiting Importation
and Mail Distribution of Obscene Materials Do Not
Violate First Amendment
I. INTRODUCTION
Near the end of the 1970-71 term, the Supreme Court considered
two cases, United States v. Reidell and United States v. Thirty-Seven
(37) Photographs,2 in which constitutional challenges were raised
against federal statutes regulating the distribution and importation of
obscene materials.3 These challenges were engendered by the apparent
irreconcilability of the Court's decisions in Roth v. United States4 and
Stanley v. Georgia.5 In Roth, the Court held that obscenity is not within
the scope of first amendment protection for speech and press. In Stanley,
however, a first amendment right to possess obscene materials in one's
home was recognized, and the Court added, by way of dictum, that a
person has the right to receive these materials. Commentators thereupon
speculated that Stanley had impliedly overruled Roth, because for the
first time, obscenity was granted limited first amendment protection,
and because a right to receive obscene matter would not be fully mean-
ingful unless a constitutional right to commercially distribute obscene
materials was established.6 Although many lower courts followed the
commentators' rationale, 7 the Supreme Court, in the instant cases, re-
1. 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
2. 402 U.S. 363 (1971).
3. The statutes involved are 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964) and 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1964).
Section 1461 states in part: "Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article, matter,
thing, device, or substance; and-
Every written or printed card, letter, . . . advertisement, . . . giving information, directly or
indirectly, where, or how, or from whom, or by what means any of such mentioned matters, articles,
or things may be obtained or made, .
Is declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the mails or delivered from any
post office or by any letter carrier." Section 1305(a) provides in relevant part: "All persons are
prohibited from importing into the United States from any foreign country. . . any obscene book,
pamphlet, . . . print, picture, drawing, or other representation. . . . [A]II such articles . . . shall
be subject to seizure and forfeiture as hereinafter provided:. . . Pro videdfurther, that the Secretary
of the Treasury may, in his discretion, admit the so-called classics or books of recognized and
established literary or scientific merit, but may, in his discretion, admit such classics or books only
when imported for non-commercial purposes."
4. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
5. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
6. See, e.g., Katz, Privacy and Pornography: Stanley v. Georgia, 1969 Sup. CT. REv. 203,
213; note 49 infra and accompanying text.
7. See notes 50 & 51 infra.
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fused to recognize a right to distribute obscene matter, denied the right
to possess obscene materials when incident to importation for commer-
cial purposes, and expressly reaffirmed Roth. The questions thus pre-
sented by the Court's holding are whether there still exists a right to
possess and receive obscene materials, and if so, what is its scope.
II. THE RIGHT To POSSESS
The right to possess obscene materials, although not explicitly rec-
ognized until Stanley, had its origins in the landmark case of Roth v.
United States." In Roth, the Court rejected the traditional first amend-
ment tests of clear and present danger9 and of balancing individual and
societal interests, 10 and held simply that obscenity is not within the area
of constitutionally protected speech or press." Thus, immediately after
Roth, the only issue presented in obscenity cases was whether the mate-
rial in question was obscene.' 2 The definition of obscenity formulated in
Roth,13 however, lacked sufficient specificity to be consistently applied
in different factual settings." In attempting to formulate a comprehen-
sive standard, the Court stated in Memoirs v. Massachusetts,'5 that for
8. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Obscenity statutes were not attacked on the grounds of infringement
of first amendment freedoms of speech and press until 1948 when a defendant's conviction was
affirmed by an evenly divided Court. Doubleday & Co. v. New York, 335 U.S. 848 (1948). In the
first important obscenity case, Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957), the Court found a state
statute that protected children by restricting the reading and viewing freedoms of adults to be
unconstitutional. Roth, however, was the first case in which obscenity regulation and the first
amendment freedoms were clearly put at issue. Note, First Amendment: The New Metaphysics of
the Law of Obscenity, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1257, 1261 (1969).
9. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (modified "clear and present danger" test).
10. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (balancing of individual
and societal interests).
11. The Court in Roth derived this "exception" theory to first amendment protection of
speech and press from Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), in which "fighting
words" were found not to be within the scope of the first amendment. Thus two levels of speech
were created in Roth-the level of non-obscene speech that is shielded by the first amendment, and
the vulnerable level of obscenity. See Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup.
CT. REV. 1.
12. See Kalven, supra note 11; Comment, Stanley v. Georgia: New Directions in Obscenity
Regulations?, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 646 (1970). See also Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscen-
ity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5 (1960).
13. "[W]hether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest." 354 U.S. at
489.
14. See, e.g., R. KuH, FOOLISH FIGLEAVEs? 215 (1967); Magrath, The Obscenity Cases:
Grapes of Roth, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 7. The Court itself has expressed dismay over its formulation
of a workable standard: "[N]o stable approach to the obscenity problem has yet been devised by
this Court." Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 455 (1966).
15. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
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matter to be obscene, it must be patently offensive to contemporary
community standards, appeal to the prurient interest, and be utterly
without redeeming social value.16 During this definitional evolution,
however, whenever the obscenity determination was a close one, the
Court began to look beyond the material itself to such factors as the
conduct of the defendant and the manner in which the allegedly obscene
material was disseminated. 7 The Supreme Court, in Redrup v. New
York,18 summarized these determinative factors, deemed to be represen-
tative of legitimate state interests, when it reversed three obscenity con-
victions in which none of the allegedly obscene materials was thrust upon
an unwilling audience, 9 sold to minors 20 or "pandered." 12' The precise
holding of Redrup, nevertheless, was difficult to ascertain, because the
second part of the opinion contained various inapposite definitions of
obscenity espoused by the members of the Court,22 and ended with the
cryptic phrase, "Whichever of these constitutional views is brought to
bear upon the case before us, it is clear that the judgments cannot
stand. ' 23 The ambiguity spawned in Redrup also emerged in subsequent
lower court decisions. One line of cases assumed that the materials in
Redrup were obscene under the Roth test, but reasoned that because no
legitimate state interests were present, the convictions could not stand.24
Thus the Roth principle, denying first amendment protection to obscen-
16. Id. at418.
17. E.g., Engdahl, Requiem for Roth: Obscenity Doctrine is Changing, 68 MIcH. L. REV.
185, 193-98 (1969); Monaghan, Obscenity, 1966: The Marriage of Obscenity Per Se and Obscenity
Per Quod, 76 YALE L.J. 127, 142-48 (1966); Comment, supra note 12; see Ginzburg v. New York,
383 U.S. 463 (1966); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
18. 386 U.S. 767 (1967) (per curiam).
19. Id. at 769.
20. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (sale of materials, not obscene by adult
standards, to minors can be constitutionally proscribed).
21. Ginzburg v. New York, 383 U.S. 463 (1966) (conviction sustained when defendant en-
gaged in the commercial exploitation of materials which were close to being obscene under the Roth
test).
22. Justices Warren, Fortas, and Brennan subscribed to the view espoused by the Court in
Memoirs v. Massachusetts. 386 U.S. at 770-71; see notes 15 and 16 supra and accompanying text.
Mr. Justice White adhered to the Roth standard. 386 U.S. at 771; see note 13 supra. Mr. Justice
Stewart believed that the State's power in the obscenity area is "narrowly limited to a distinct and
clearly identifiable class of material"-i.e. "hard core" pornography. 386 U.S. at 770; see Ginz-
burg v. New York, 383 U.S. 463, 499 & n.3 (1966) (dissenting opinion). Justices Black and Douglas
consistently maintained that the State does not have any power to suppress or control materials
on the ground of their "obscenity." 386 U.S. at 770; see Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508
(1957) (dissenting opinion). The views of Justices Harlan and Clark were not stated in Redrup.
23. 386U.S.at771.
24. E.g., United States v. 127,295 Copies of a Magazine Entitled "Amor," 295 F. Supp.
1186 (D. Md. 1968); United States v. 4,400 Copies of Magazines, 276 F. Supp, 902 (D. Md. 1967).
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ity, was repudiated and the balancing of interests test reinstated. On the
other hand, several courts 25 viewed Redrup as being consistent with
Roth, but restricted the definition of obscenity to essentially "hard core
pornography." An apparent resolution of the dilemma, which brought
obscenity within the scope of first amendment protection, occurred in
Stanley v. Georgia.2 7 The defendant in Stanley was convicted under a
Georgia statute for possessing obscene materials in his house. The Su-
preme Court reversed his conviction on the grounds that the first and
fourteenth amendments guarantee a person the right to receive and pos-
sess material, irrespective of its lack of redeeming social value, within
the privacy of his own home. The "narrow" holding of Stanley-only
private possession of obscene matter is constitutionally protected-has
rarely been considered in the context of criminal prosecutions, and those
courts considering the issue have failed to reach consistent interpreta-
tions of Stanley. The courts either have narrowly restricted first amend-
ment protection to possession within one's own home zs or have broad-
ened first amendment protection to private possession without regard to
location.2 9 The latter non-locative test was utilized in United States v.
Various Articles of "Obscene" Merchandise30 a case involving the im-
portation31 of obscene material for private, noncommercial purposes.32
The district court relied on Stanley as authority to distinguish vulnerable
public uses of obscenity from private uses, which are protected by the
first amendment as long as the material does not fall into the hands of
children, is not "pandered," or is not thrust upon an unwilling public.
25. E.g., Luros v. United States, 389 F.2d 200, 205 (8th Cir. 1968); People v. Stabile, 58
Misc. 2d 905, 296 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. 1969).
26. "1 shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material . . . embraced within
that shorthand description . . . . But I know it when I see it." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184,
197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). The situation was complicated further by the Supreme Court
itself when numerous obscenity convictions were subsequently reversed in per curiam decisions that
cited Redrup as authority without any explanation. E.g., Aday v. United States, 388 U.S. 447
(1967); Books, Inc. v. United States, 388 U.S. 449 (1967); see Teeter & Pember, The Retreat from
Obscenity: Redrup v. New York, 21 HASTINGs L.J. 175 (1969).
27. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
28. State v. Reese, 222 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 1969).
29. Stein v. Batchelor, 300 F. Supp. 602 (N.D. Tex. 1969), vacated on other grounds sub
nom., Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971) (per curiam).
30. 315 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
31. 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1964) forbids the importation of obscene materials.
32. Most of the cases decided under § 1305(a) involved commercial distributors of pornogra-
phy. Cf. United States v. 392 Copies of a Magazine Entitled "Exclusive," 373 F.2d 633 (4th Cir.),
rev'd on other grounds sub nora., Central Magazine Sales, Ltd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 50
(1967) (per curiam); United States v. A Motion Picture Film Entitled "Pattern of Evil," 304 F.
Supp. 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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Finding the materials in question to be protected from seizure by cus-
toms officials, the court impliedly held that first amendment protection
of private possession of obscene matter was not confined in location to
one's home.33 Although the Supreme Court did not hear the Various
Articles of "Obscene" Merchandise case,3 it was able to rule defini-
tively on virtually identical issues in United States v. Thirty-Seven (37)
Photographs.35 In that case, United States customs officials, pursuant
to section 1305(a) of title 19, United States Code, seized 37 admittedly
obscene photographs from claimant's luggage during an inspection.
Subsequently, the government instituted forfeiture proceedings 36 to
which claimant answered and counterclaimed. Conceding that the pho-
tographs were to be published in book form, claimant contended that
section 1305(a) is unconstitutional because the first amendment, as con-
strued in Stanley, protects the right of an adult to import obscene mate-
rial for private use or to receive it from a commercial distributor after
importation. The Government maintained that this interpretation of the
first amendment would completely impair congressional power to regu-
late the importation of obscene matter. In adopting the Government's
position3 7 the Supreme Court distinguished Stanley by finding first that
a port of entry is not the same as one's home, and secondly, that the
right to be left alone in one's home does not prevent customs inspections
or the seizure of illegal articles.3 1 On these two bases, as well as Roth's
33. "Where, as here, a federal statute by its terms prohibits importation by an individual of
obscene material for his own private use and enjoyment in his home, such a broad prohibition
offends the First Amendment and must be held unconstitutional." 315 F. Supp. at 196.
34. When Various Articles of "Obscene" Merchandise was appealed, probable jurisdiction
was noted, 402 U.S. 971 (1971), but the Supreme Court was precluded from hearing the case,
because the Justice Department voluntarily dismissed under Sup. CT. R. 60. 403 U.S. 942 (1971).
35. 402 U.S. 363 (1971).
36. 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1964) provides that: "Upon the seizure of such book or matter
the collector shall transmit information thereof to the district attorney . . . who shall institute
proceedings in the district court for the forfeiture, confiscation, and destruction of the book or
matter seized. Upon the adjudication that such book or matter thus seized is of the character that
entry of which is by this section prohibited, it shall be ordered destroyed and shall be destroyed."
37. The Court's consideration of the right to import obscene materials was confined to the
second part of the opinion. In the first part, Mr. Justice White dealt with the issue whether the
lack of time limits for instituting forfeiture proceedings violated first amendment procedural safe-
guards. The Court found that § 1305(a) could withstand a constitutional attack by construing it
as requiring judicial forfeiture proceedings to be instituted no more than 14 days after seizure of
allegedly obscene materials, and requiring a final decision in the district court no more than 60
days after filing of action unless delays are caused by claimant or by a 3-judge court's being
convened to hear a constitutional challenge. Since in the instant case, proceedings were instituted
13 days after seizure, the Court held that the Government did not go beyond the procedural limits
of § 1305 and infringe claimant's first amendment rights.
38. The Court also stated that the right to possess obscene material in one's home, announced
in Stanley, did not imply A right to import obscene matter from abroad.
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holding that obscenity is not constitutionally protected, the Court39 con-
cluded that Congress had the power to declare that obscenity is contra-
band and to exclude it from entry into the country, whether it was
intended for private use or commercial distribution. Thirty-Seven
Photographs thus casts doubt on the right to possess and as a conse-
quence places in question the vitality of the right to receive obscene
materials.
III. THE RIGHT To RECEIVE
The right to receive information and ideas and to distribute them
to willing recipients was first recognized by the Supreme Court in
Martin v. City of Struthers.'" In that case, the defendant, who had been
handing out religious literature, was convicted of violating a city ordi-
nance that prohibited door-to-door distribution of handbills, circulars,
and advertisements. In holding the ordinance unconstitutional, the
Court weighed the social value of the city ordinance against the first
amendment freedoms of speech and press and found that an individual's
right to distribute information and ideas was "so clearly vital to the
preservation of a free society that . . . it must be fully preserved."', The
Court further declared that the first amendment right to distribute infor-
mation necessarily implies a right to receive. This implied right to receive
was expressly reaffirmed in the concurring opinion of Justices Goldberg
and Brennan in Lamont v. Postmaster General,12 in which petitioner
solicited from a foreign country material that was adjudged by the Post
Office to be communist political propaganda. Pursuant to section 305(a)
of the Postal Service and Federal Employee's Salary Act of 1962,11 the
Post Office notified petitioner that in order to receive this material he
would have to request delivery by returning an attached reply card. The
majority opinion held that this government-imposed obligation was an
unconstitutional limitation on the unfettered exercise of petitioner's first
amendment rights.4 Justice Brennan added that to fully effectuate the
first amendment right to distribute ideas, as recognized in Martin, there
39. The majority opinion represented the views of only 4 Justices. Three Justices dissented,
and Mr. Justice Stewart concurred with Part I of the Court's opinion, but rejected the Court's
dictum that the Government may lawfully seize material intended for the private use of the im-
porter. Mr. Justice Harlan likewise concurred in Part I, but refrained from committing himself on
the issu7 of private possession of obscene materials.
40.s 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
41. Id. at 146-47.
42. 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965).
43. Pub. L. No. 87-793, § 305(a), 76 Stat. 840.
44. 381 U.S. at 305.
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also must exist a constitutional right to receive information.45 Thus the
official act required by the statute was viewed an unconstitutional in-
fringement of petitioner's first amendment right to receive information
and ideas. Because Martin and Lamont both assumed that the materials
in question were protected by the first amendment " the rationale of these
cases would not apply to obscene material, for under Roth such material
was beyond the protection of the first amendment. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court in Stanley relied upon the dicta in Martin and Lamont
for the proposition that an individual had the "right to receive informa-
tion and ideas, regardless of their social worth."' 47 The Court's emphatic
statement of that proposition" created immediate speculation among
legal scholars that some constitutional protection under the first amend-
ment also must exist for the distribution of pornography.49 Because of
the Supreme Court's ambiguity on this point a split developed among
the courts. Some adopted the view that distribution itself is protected
and declared many federal50 and state5' obscenity regulations unconstitu-
tional. On the other hand, some courts restricted Stanley to first amend-
ment protection for possession only,52 creating the need for Supreme




defendant sent concededly obscene materials through the mails in viola-
45. 381 U.S. at 308 (concurring opinion).
46. In both cases the Court weighed the individual and state interests involved, and in finding
no compelling state interests, held the statutes involved unconstitutional. 319 U.S. at 143 (Martin);
381 U.S. at 301; id. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring) (Lamont).
47. 394 U.S. at 564.
48. "This right to receive information and ideas . . . is fundamental to our free society."
Id.
49. See, e.g., Engdahl, supra note 17, at 198-201; The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV.
L. Rav. 7, 151-52 (1969); Note, Obscenity from Stanley to Karalexis: A Back Door Approach to
First Amendment Protection, 23 VAND. L. Rav. 369 (1970).
50. Two federal district courts in California invalidated § 1461, which prohibits the knowing
use of the mails for distribution of obscene materials. United States v. Lethe, 312 F. Supp. 421
(E.D. Cal. 1970); United States v. Reidel (C.D. Cal., June 8, 1970) (unreported). Two federal
district courts in Wisconsin held unconstitutional § 1462, which forbids the interstate transporta-
tion of obscene matter. United States v. B & H Dist. Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1231 (W.D. Wis. 1970),
vacated, 403 U.S. 927 (1971); United States v. Orito, No. 70-CR-20 (E.D. Wis., Oct. 28, 1970),
appeal docketed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3006 (U.S. July 13, 1971) (No. 1276, 1970 Term; renumbered No.
69, 1971 Term).
51. Hayse v. Van Hoomissen, 321 F. Supp. 642 (D. Ore. 1970), vacated on other grounds,
403 U.S. 927 (1971); Karalexis v. Byrne, 306 F. Supp. 1363 (D. Mass. 1969), vacated on other
grounds, 401 U.S. 216 (1971) (per curiam); Stein v. Batchelor, 300 F. Supp. 602 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
52. E.g., Miller v, United States, 431 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1970), appeal docketed, 40 U.S.L.W.
3006 (U.S. July 13, 1971) (No. 1014, 1970 Term; renumbered No. 43, 1971 Term); United States
v. Fragus, 428 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Melvin, 419 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1969)
(dictum).
53. 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
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tion of section 1461 of Title 18, United States Code, which prohibits the
knowing use of the mails for delivery of obscene matter. A postal inspec-
tor, who had ordered the materials in response to defendant's newspaper
advertisement, complied with the advertisement's requirement that the
recipient be at least 21 years old and so stated in his order.54 Defendant
contended that section 1461 is unconstitutional as applied because the
first amendment protects the act of mailing obscene materials by virtue
of the recipient's right, as set forth in Stanley, to receive and possess
these materials when they are not directed at minors or unwilling adults.
On the basis of Roth, the Government maintained that the first amend-
ment offers no protection for the distribution of obscene materials. In
its opinion in Reidel,5 the Supreme Court found that there was no
factual distinction between the instant case and Roth, since both in-
volved the sale and distribution of obscene matter in violation of section
1461. It concluded, therefore, that Roth would control the instant case
unless Stanley compelled a different result. The Stanley decision, ac-
cording to the Court, was grounded on the individual's freedom of
thought and right of privacy in his own home. Observing that these
rights were independently saved by the first amendment, the Court stated
that it was unnecessary to create a constitutional right for the distribu-
tion of obscenity in order to protect them. Moreover, since the facts in
the instant case did not involve a question of privacy, but rather the
question of obscenity distribution, Stanley was held to be inapplicable.
Roth, therefore, was found to control the instant case and the Court held
that section 1461 as applied did not violate defendant's first amendment
rights of speech and press.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES OF THE RIGHT To
POSSESS AND To RECEIVE
Viewing Stanley in light of the instant cases, the right to possess
and receive obscene materials has been greatly restricted, but has not
54. The advertisement was as follows: "Imported Pornography-Learn the true facts before
sending money abroad. Send $1.00 for our fully illustrated booklet. You must be 21 years of age
and so state. Normax Press, P.O. Box 989, Fontana, California, 92335." 402 U.S. at 353 n.3.
55. In deciding the case, the Court assumed the materials in question to be obscene and,
because the Government could produce no evidence to the contrary, likewise assumed that defendant
had mailed only to willing adult recipients. As such, the legitimate state interests enunciated in
Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967), were not present. The majority opinion represented the
views of 5 Justices. Justice Harlan concurred, 402 U.S. at 357, and Justices Black and Douglas
dissented, 402 U.S. at 379. Mr. Justice Marshall, who authored Stanley, concurred on the grounds
that the mail-order distribution of obscene materials in the case at bar did not have sufficient
safeguards against receipt by unwilling adults or minors. 402 U.S. at 360.
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been completely extinguished because there still remains an area of
constitutional protection for obscenity. In Stanley, the Supreme Court
declared that Roth and its progeny did not control private possession
of obscene materials in one's home because Roth "dealt with the
power of the State and Federal Governments to prohibit or regulate
certain public actions taken or intended to be taken with respect to
obscene matter."56 The opinion stated further that "Roth and the cases
following it discerned .. .an 'important interest' in the regulation of
commercial distribution of obscene materials. '5 7 It thus appears from
Stanley that the Supreme Court has separated obscenity cases into two
distinct areas: public activity, which is outside the scope of the first
amendment, and private actions, which are constitutionally protected. 5
This distinction can be supported on five bases. First, the overwhelming
majority of courts applying Stanley acknowledged the dichotomy, often
by way of dictum, between private and public actions involving obscen-
ity.55 Cases dealing directly with this issue have resulted in decisions that
narrowed the scope of the criminal sanction under section 1461 by allow-
ing consenting adults to exchange obscene matter through the mails,"
and that construed section 1305 to allow importation of obscene matter
for private purposes.6" Secondly, the legislative history of the federal
obscenity statutes 2 impliedly removes consensual, noncommercial ex-
56. 394 U.S. at 561 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 563-64 (emphasis added).
58. See id. at 562 n.7; Comment, Private Morality and the Right to be Free: The Thrust of
Stanley v. Georgia, 11 ARIz. L. REv. 731 (1969). See also THE REPORT OF THE COMnMISSION ON
OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 354-60 (Bantam ed. 1970).
59. E.g., United States v. Fragus, 428 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1970) (dictum); Gable v. Jenkins,
309 F. Supp. 998 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (dictum).
60. United States v. Dellapia, 433 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1970).
61. United States v. Various Articles of "Obscene" Merchandise, 315 F. Supp. 191
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), appeal dismissed, 403 U.S. 942 (1971).
62. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461-65 (1964). For an in-depth study of the legislative history of § 1461
see Paul, The Post Office and Non-Mailability of Obscenity: An Historical Note, 8 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 44 (1961).
Section 1462 prohibits the knowing use of a common carrier for transportation of obscene
matter in interstate commerce. For legislative history of § 1462 since 1950 see H.R. REP. No. 2017,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2438 and S. REP. No. 1839,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), 1958 U.S. CoDa CONG. &AD. NEws 4012.
18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1964) states in part: "Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign
commerce for the purpose of sale or distribution any obscene, lewd, . . . book, pamphlet, picture
...or any other matter of indecent or immoral character, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both." For legislative history of § 1465 see notes 63 & 64
infra.
For the legislative history of 19 U.S.C. § 1305 see H.R. REP. No. 1326, 71st. Cong., 2d Sess.
105 (1930) (amend. No. 1116).
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change of obscene materials from the scope of these sections. For exam-
ple, when section 1461 was amended in 1955 to broaden its application,
the major congressional concern was to "prevent the use of the mails in
the trafficking of all obscene materials. '8 3 At the same time, section
1465 was added to patch the loophole in the law that allowed distributors
to transport obscene material by private conveyance. In proscribing this
activity, however, section 1465 was expressly restricted to interstate
transportation for "sale and distribution." If the avowed purpose of the
legislative action was "to complete the pattern of control over obscen-
ity," 64 the exclusion of interstate transportation of obscene materials for
private use from the purview of section 1465 indicates that Congress
intended only commercialized obscenity to be proscribed by the "pattern
of control" of all of these regulations. 5 Section 1305 also grants to the
Secretary of the Treasury the discretion to admit classics or other mate-
rial of literary merit, even though admittedly obscene, but "only when
imported for noncommercial purposes." Thirdly, the American Law
Institute's Model Penal Code has proposed to exclude private, noncom-
mercial possession or transfer of obscene material from criminal sanc-
tion,66 in order to be consistent with the basic purpose of its approach
to pornography regulation, which is to penalize the panderer and not the
customer-victim, and with the literal congressional exemption in section
1465.67 Fourthly, the present policy of the Justice Department is not to
prosecute private individuals who exchange obscene materials through
the mail unless the case involves repeated offenders or aggravated cir-
cumstances.6" Lastly, the Supreme Court's decisions in the instant cases
do not preclude first amendment protection for private obscenity activ-
ity. In Reidel, since the Court was concerned solely with the alleged
constitutional right to commercially distribute obscene materials, it left
unanswered the question whether there is a constitutional shield for
noncommercial distribution or postal correspondence. Despite the
63. S. REP, No. 113, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955), 1955 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2210.
64. H.R. REP. No. 690, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1955).
65. See Note, Private Correspondence & Federal Prosecutions, 4 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 76
(1967); 1966 UTAH L. REv. 717 (1966).
66. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10, Comment (4) at 13-14 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
67. Other reasons put forth by the ALl for this section were that noncommercial activity
would be restricted in scope thus minimizing potential harm, and that this provision would be
consistent with the other code sections that made private illicit sexual acts noncriminal. Id. Section
207.10 was amended in the proposed official draft of the Model Penal Code to eliminate the burden
of proof placed on the person asserting the defense and remove the apparent criminal sanction
against parents for dispensing obscene material to their children. MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.4(3)
(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
68. See Redmond v. United States, 384 U.S. 264,265 (1966).
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